In the Inverse Set relative to a Semivalue, we are looking for a new game for which the Semivalue of the original game is coalitional rational. The problem is solved by means of the Power Game of the given game. The procedures of building the new game, as well as the case of the Banzhaf Value are illustrated by means of some examples.
Introduction
In an earlier work of the author [1] , the Inverse Problem for the Shapley Value has been introduced and solved: for whatever n-vector, find out the set of all TU games for which the Shapley Value equals that a priori given vector. In a more recent work [2] , the Inverse Problem was solved for Semivalues, including the Banzhaf Value. Like in the first case, the solution was called the Inverse Set, relative to the Semivalue, and was given by an explicit formula expressing all games associated with that Semivalue, defined by a fixed weight vector. In a recent work [3] , it was also reminded that the Shapley Value, may not be coalitional rational, that is, in general, it does not belong to the Core of the game. In [3] , another problem was introduced and solved: given a TU game, for which we know the Shapley Value, or some other efficient value, find out a game with the same Shapley Value, or the alternative efficient value, but in which the considered value is coalitional rational. For the Shapley Value, in technical words, in the Inverse Set relative to the given Shapley Value, find out a TU game for which this Shapley Value is coalitional rational.
In the present paper, the similar problem is now considered for the Banzhaf Value and the Semivalues, (values introduced in [4] [5] , respectively). These values are usually non-efficient, so that they will not be in the Core; therefore we have to define now what it is a coalitional rational Banzhaf Value, and more general a Semi-
The Inverse Set for Semivalues
The set of all cooperative TU games, on a finite set of player N, with two operations, addition and scalar multiplication, is a linear vector space, to be denoted by ( ) 
The Semivalue may be extended to the sets of games in 
Among 
together with the weight vectors derived by means of (2). The first is usually non-efficient, while the second is always efficient. We mean that the Banzhaf Value may be efficient for some games and non-efficient for others, while the Shapley Value is efficient for all games. An example showing the first situation follows.
Example 1: a) Consider the game ( ) [7] . For those Semivalues which are efficient, only in the case of some games, there is no need to define again the coalitional rationality.
b) The fact that this may not happen is shown by the game
for the Banzhaf Value, which is a particular Semivalue. With the same weight vector, we find ( )
, and this is not efficient, because the sum makes 59 14 4 ≠ , while the coalitional rationality conditions are satisfied. Clearly, we have to discuss also the coalitional rationality for non-efficient Semivalues.
c) The most general case is the one when for some game and some value, both the efficiency and the coalitional rationality conditions do not hold. For example, if we take for the same game (6) the Semivalue defined by the weight vector
, which satisfies the condition (1), then from formula (3), we obtain ( )
Now, neither the efficiency, nor the coalitional rationality conditions are holding, because the sum of payoffs makes 77 14 6 ≠ , and
does not hold; in other words, the last situation is the general case.
Note that in (6) the Shapley Value is
which is efficient and coalitional rational. Note the fourth situation, the well known fact that efficient Semivalues equal the Shapley Value, but this may be, or not, coalitional rational; the first case was met above.
Return to the set of games N G , the union of the vector spaces ( ), 
where n L R ∈ . The Inverse Problem for Semivalues, discussed in [2] , can be stated as follows: find out all TU games in the space ( ) G N for which the Semivalue associated with the weight vector n p , equals L. This problem has already been solved in the above mentioned work of the author, and we shall sketch the solution, before going to the related problem of coalitional rationality. In the space
defined by means of the formulas (2) . It is easy to see that these are linearly independent vectors and the set W has the cardinality 2 1 n − , hence this is a basis of the space. Thus, any TU game ( )
for some values of the constant coefficients. In the earlier work, it has been shown the following auxiliary results:
These equalities, as well as the linearity of the Semivalues, shown by formula (3), give
In [2] , it has been proved that this is the general solution of the Inverse Problem for the considered Semivalue, that is it is offering an explicit expression for the games in the Inverse Set. Note also from (10) that the parenthesis in (11) has a null Semivalue, hence a basis of the null subspace is also shown in (11), namely
with dimension 2 1.
n n − − Now, a new problem to be discussed in this paper will be introduced, starting with the concept of Power Game, to be used in connection with the coalitional rationality. , N v is efficient in any subgame of the Power Game. The Core of the Power Game is called the Power Core. Now, the natural approach in discussing how to share fairly the total win of the grand coalition in the given game is that of following the ideas introduced in the earlier paper [6] : we shall consider the Semivalue of the given game as efficient and coalitional rational, if it belongs to the Power Core. Hence, to check whether, or not, this happens, we should compute the Power Core.
The Power Game of the Inverse Set and the Coalitional Rationality
However, it will be easier to use a computational formula for the Power Core proved also in the same paper [2] ; this will be done next, because we shall compute only the worth of coalitions of size 1 n − . The problem similar to the one discussed above may be stated as: for a given game ( )
in which the Semivalue of the given game is also efficient and coalitional rational. Now, there are two cases: either the Semivalue is in the Core of the Power Game for the given game, or not. In the first case, the Semivalue is considered coalitional rational; in the other case, from Now, an arbitrary game in the almost null subfamily of the Inverse Set, relative to the Semivalue 0 L ≥ , is given by
and depends on the parameter N c . From (14) and (8), as all the characteristic functions of the basic games are null when 2 S n ≤ − , we get ( ) 0, , (14) and (8),we get
w S S S n
Similarly we obtain ( )
As noticed above, this game belongs to the almost null subfamily of Inverse Set, for any value of the parameter, and we may check that the Semivalue of any game in this family equals the Semivalue of the original game.
From (15), based upon the definition (13), we can compute the Power Game of ( ) Instead, the Power Game of ( ) , N w may be easier computed by using the formula from the previous work mentioned above, precisely
, . (8) and (16) we get
and the efficiency is holding, because we have also ( )
In this way, we almost proved the following main result: Theorem: Suppose that the Semivalue, associated with a given weight vector 
the Semivalue is in the Power Core, if and only if the parameter N c satisfies the inequality
where the minimum is taken over the index i N ∈ . Proof: Taking into account the above formulas (17), (18), for the Power Game, the Power Core is given by 0,
from which the result (20) follows, as the efficiency is obvious. ■ Note that the inequality (20) does not depend on the weight vector and it is the same as in [2] , the case of the Shapley Value and other efficient values. This is not surprising, because this theorem is also applicable to the Shapley Value, as the Shapley Value is a particular Semivalue. Other remarks will be discussed later, for the moment let us illustrate the results contained in the theorem. 
Obviously, the conditions
hold, but the Semivalue is not efficient, because this sum makes 1000; hence, it does not belong to the Core, even though the coaltional rationality conditions hold. Compute the characteristic function for all the coalitions of size two in an arbitrary game belonging to the almost null subfamily of the Inverse Set, relative to the Semivalue and to the vector shown in formula (22), by using the formulas (15). We get ( ) 
We may check that the Semivalue of this game is the same as the one in the original game, for whatever value of the parameter N c The inequality which gives the coalitional rationality, that is (20), is ( )
where the Semivalue denoted by L, is provided by (22 π π π π π π π
We see that the Semivalue is efficient in the Power Game (34) of the Game (33) and we check easily that it is also coalitional rational; hence (33) is the solution of our problem.
d) An interesting case is the case of the Binomial Semivalues, a class of Semivalues introduced in [8] , and discussed in [9] .
Conclusion
The present work is a continuation of our earlier work [2] , on the Inverse Problem of Semivalues. By discussing the new problem of the game with the same value, but coalitional rational, we believe that we give also a motivation for the concept of Inverse Set. We introduced this new problem and we offered an explicit numerical procedure for solving the problem, as seen in the examples that are following the theory given above. A nice introduction is the case of efficient values considered in [3] , as well as the application to the case of Binomial Semivalues shown in [9] .
